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Rod Northey* Conflicting Principles of Canadian
Environmental Reform: Trubeck
and Habermas v. Law
and Economics and the
Law Reform Commission
I. Introduction
Early in the 1970s, the American legal scholar, David Trubeck, made a
far-reaching observation:
Law is a practical science. It does not ordinarily dwell on fundamental
questions about the social, political and economic functions of the legal
order. Satisfied with implicit working assumptions about these matters,
legal thought moves rapidly to more tractable questions. But when law's
solutions to social problems fail to satisfy, it becomes necessary to examine
the basic theory from which they derive1.
Trubeck expounded this thesis in connection with legal developments
in the Third World. Using an idea he termed the "core conception" of
law, Trubeck argued that "this conception has misdirected the study of
law and development by asserting that one type of law - that found in
the West - is essential for economic, political, and social development
in the Third World."'2
This paper applies Trubeck's observation to Canadian environmental
law reform. It emphasizes two points. First, environmental law is not
centered in the environment or in the law; it is centered in a particular
society's social, political and economic outlook. Trubeck suggests that
law is best considered as only an effect of progressive society, not a cause.
As such, law is confined to an instrumental status3: it is the means of
reform, but not itself the impetus. For this reason, legal reform is not
simply a matter of looking elsewhere for interesting approaches and then
legislating them into a particular society. Instead, law reform is dependent
on appreciating a society's particular composition.
Second, the paper emphasizes that Canadian society has a distinct
social, political and economic perspective, demanding distinct
environmental reforms. It suggests that Canadian institutional theory
* LL.B. Dalhousie, 1987. The author wishes to thank Professors Stephen Mills and David
Fraser, of the Dalhousie Law School (1985-86) for their help in preparing this paper.
1. "Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development"
(1982), 82 Yale L.J. 1.
2. Id., at 2.
3. Id., at 5.
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contains a peculiar dichotomy. On the one hand, Canadian legal theorists
assume a progressive society, one amenable to American reforms. Our
British tradition is deprecated as colonial, the American tradition is
exalted as independent and dynamic. Our Charter of Rights and
Freedoms is the most significant of such reforms.
On the other hand, Canadian economic and political theorists
recognize clear differences between Canadian and American positions.
Economic theory takes account of our small population, our regional
differences, and our decentered markets. Economically, we have not
displayed the capacity to move as dynamically as American society. In
turn, political theory recognizes that the Canadian tradition is unlike the
strongly adversarial balance of powers of the American tradition, without
being strongly hierarchical like the British political tradition. Canadian
democracy tows a middle line. Legal reform must reconcile this
divergence between legal theory and economic or political theory.
From this position, two current legal perspectives on environmental
reform are problematic. First, there is the perspective provided by the
Law Reform Commission of Canada's current project, the Protection of
Life series. This paper compares the project's three initial reports: Crimes
Against the Environment4, Sentencing in Environmental Law5, and
Political Economy of Environmental Hazard6.
The reports are problematic for two reasons. As part of general
environmental reform, none provide reform that takes specific account of
the Canadian context. Crimes discusses environmental law from a larger
philosophical perspective, but only provides the limited reform of a new
Criminal Code offence. It fails to surmount the limitations that inhibit the
use of present Code offences against the environment. Sentencing
explores the many sentencing options available to reformers, but the most
pressing problems - corporate liability, for example - and the most
promising solutions - compensation, for example - are given only
cursory discussion. Finally, Political Economy deals with the problems
arising from governmental action with respect to the environment, but it
fails to propose any solutions.
As part of specific legal reform, the reports are inconsistent. Crimes
and Sentencing focus on enforcement issues. Crimes deals with an aspect
of environmental liability while Sentencing examines environmental
remedies. Both recommend further means for government to crack down
on industry. Political Economy, on the other hand, addresses both the
4. Keyserlink, E.W., Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985.
5. Swaigen, J., Bunt, G., Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985.
6. Schrecker, T.E, Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1984.
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enforcement and the establishment of government standards; it argues
that the present regulatory approach involves the close cooperation of
industry and government, but the exclusion of public interests. The three
reports are thus ill-fitting pieces in the environmental jig-saw: the specific
reports propound government's role as enforcer; the general report
criticizes government's role as regulator. How can government provide
effective enforcement where it is an ineffective regulator?
The second problematic perspective on environmental law is that of
legal instrumentalism. Instrumentalism misjudges the nature of human
interaction. Instrumental interests contrast with communicative interests.
The work of the German theorist, Jurgen Habermas, limits instrumental
interests to our relation to nature, where we pursue an ethic of controla.
He argues that social relations demand higher, communicative values,
values that follow the egalitarian ethic of recognition7. This conclusion
undermines recent work of Law and Economics theorists. In particular,
Habermas' perspective highlights the conflict economic efficiency has
with democracy. Efficiency demands large-scale operations; democracy
demands individual representation. Clearly, efficiency criteria settle
disputes differently than do democratic criteria.
From these criticisms of contemporary trends in environmental
reform, the paper concludes with an examination of a Canadian
environmental reform that follows Trubeck's extra-legal considerations
and Habermas' communicative concerns. These different recommenda-
tions are put to practical use in the example of the "Manitoba
experiment"' . The Manitoba experiment provides an example of
government working cooperatively, both internally within its
bureaucracy and externally toward the general public. Such cooperation
involved gathering information and constructing a comprehensive land
use development strategy, involving economic, social, and environmental
values. The experiment was thus an effective demonstration of
government tying together instrumental interests with citizenship values.
This discussion of Canadian environmental reform has three parts:
(1) The Law Reform Commission Reports on environmental reform;
(2) Habermas and the critique of instrumentalism;
(3) The Manitoba experiment.
6a. Habermas, J. "A Reply to My Critics", from Thompson, J.B., Held, D., Habermas:
CriticalDebates (M.I.T. Press: Cambridge, 1982) at 243-4.
7. Id., at 248.
8. Page, J.E., Carvalho, M.E., "Southern Manitoba: An Experiment in Regional Action",
from Leiss, W., Ecology Versus Politics in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1979) at 202-
32.
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The first part begins with an examination of Crimes Against the
Environment and Sentencing in Environmental Law. It argues that a
similar criticism applies to both reports. This criticism is developed
through an examination of The Political Economy of Environmental
Hazards. The second part begins with Habermas' critique of
instrumentalism, and then uses this critique against Law and Economics
theory. The third part provides an example of Canadian reform that
overcomes these criticisms. It presents the Manitoba experiment as a
model process of environmental reform.
II. The Law Reform Commission of Canada and Environmental
Reform
The two Law Reform Commission reports involving environmental
enforcement can be neatly divided: Crimes Against the Environment
examines liability in environmental law, dealing specifically with
criminal liability for environmental injury; Sentencing in Environmental
Law, on the other hand, examines legal remedies, dealing specifically
with their application to environmental harm.
Crimes has a specific agenda: the creation of a new Criminal Code
offence. Its creation is symbolic as much as substantive9; environmental
harm is given a recognition equal to that given traditional harms to the
body or property0 . Protection of the environment is deemed a basic
right, not merely a public convenience".
Placing this offence in the Code is valuable symbolically since it gives
a new legitimacy to environmental harm. The report argues that
environmental harm is suitable for inclusion in the Criminal Code for
three reasons: (1) environmental harm can be seriously harmful or
endangering to society12; (2) it is harm that may be effectively deterred by
criminal prosecution, sentencing, and enforcement 3; (3) it is harm that
meets the Criminal Code's mens rea requirements for criminal
negligence 14.
Though this proposed reform has many strengths, these strengths are
outweighed by its shortcomings. The most immediate problem is that it
is not that different from offences that already exist in the Criminal Code.
While there are many places where the report discusses alternatives, in its
final product it has stuck close to traditional ground. To give two
9. Keyserlink, E.W. Lecture at Dalhousie Law School, Spring term, 1986.
10. Supra, note 4, at 8, 65.
11. Id., at 8.
12. Id., at 16-29.
13. Id., at 2 for the test of criminal liability; at 46 for the conclusion.
14. Id., at 33. The report calls for prosecution of gross negligence only.
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examples, the report suggests that the new offence might adopt an ethic
valuing nature in itself, yet it is satisfied in the end to restrict itself to the
present ethic of strictly human interests'5. Secondly, while the report
discusses the many reasons for changing the onus for environmental
crimes, it returns to the traditional stance of full onus on the
prosecution 16. Both resolutions leave the proposal similar to the present
Criminal Code offence of common nuisance17.
Nuisance's concern with both health and aesthetic issues gives it many
obvious virtues when dealing with environmental harm. Case reports
reveal, however, that it has not received much attention. The precise
reasons for this inattention would seem relevant to the Crimes report but
they are not addressed. Moreover, when one compares this "new crime"
with the existing nuisance provisions, one finds little substantive18
difference' 9.
Like the report Crimes Against the Environment, Sentencing in
EnvironmentalLaw is focussed on criminal law20, specifically the present
statutory remedies within federal and provincial environmental laws.
15. Id., at 67
16. Id., at 40.
17. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s.176:
Certainly a first restriction on nuisance is that the offence is for public, not private nuisance;
the harm must affect the general public not one or two individuals. Moreover, its inclusion in
the Criminal Code has meant that the prosecution is brought not by a member of the public
but through the authority of the Attorney-General of the federal or provincial governments
(Criminal Code, s. 2). There is, however, some reason to doubt this conclusion. The article,
"Private Prosecutions in Canada" (from Mills, Stephen Supplement to Environmental Law, (in-
house casebook), Dalhousie University, Spring term, 1986) suggests that there are no statutory
restrictions on the general common law privilege to lay information, and it is up to judicial
discretion whether a summons win be issued. This privilege applies to both summary
conviction and indictable offences. The problem with this procedure is that appeals lie only as
of statutory right; one can bring the action, but not an appeal.
A second limitation on nuisance is the mens rea requirement. Nuisance may require the full
standard of intentional harm, not the lesser negligence standard. While there are no Canadian
cases deciding this point, some early English cases in public nuisance come down on both sides.
(k. v. Medley (1834), 172 E.R.1246; R. v. Stephens (1866) L.R. 1 Q.B.702).
The third and more serious limitation on nuisance is its standard of proof - beyond a
reasonable doubt. This standard particularly cripples prosecutorial success on causation
questions, where plaintiffs have struggled to prove definite harm even on the lesser standard of
the balance of probabilities. Crimes addresses this point by arguing that it will be employed
only where the danger is clear (p. 46). All that is clear using this policy is that the offence will
not be used frequently. See also: Jeffrey, M.C. "P,. v. Sault Ste Marie Revisited" (1984), 10
Queen's L.J. 41 at 52-3.
18. Although the report adds little substantively to the nuisance provision already in the
Criminal Code, the new crime does serve a symbolic purpose of suggesting that harm to the
environment is a serious public matter.
19. The report fails to deal with causation issues. It fails to overcome the mental element
problems associated with nuisance in preferring full mens rea or gross negligence, not a lesser
standard (at 33).
20. Both reports' point of departure is criminal law since that is what the Protection of Life
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Sentencing addresses two points: the kinds of remedies available to a
court and the factors that "trigger" the various remedies. The report takes
issue with the common perception that statutory fines need to be
amended to increase their upper limits21; it argues that effective
deterrence depends more on the application of measures beyond fines.
The report considers measures such as fines, imprisonment, forfeiture
of property and licence suspension. It concludes by recommending
greater attention be focussed on restitution and compensation 22.
Unfortunately, while the report has extensive coverage of the remedies
field, it may be criticized for its emphasis. It is not clear, for example, why
remedies in environmental law should be guided by the objectives of
criminal law. While the report spends a great deal of time presenting
these aims and their relation to various remedies, it would seem more in
line with environmental harm to restrict discussion to the following three
objectives: restoration of the environment, compensation for environ-
mental harm, and deterrence of future environmental damage23.
Moreover, in spite of the report's support for restitution and
compensation, it spends little time discussing either24. Though the
question of attaching civil remedies to federal criminal offences does not
have clear constitutional support25, Sentencing never states that this is the
reason for its restricted discussion. Similarly, the report recognizes the
problems corporate liability and "white collar" crime pose to fair
sentencing practices; yet, again, it does not provide more than a summary
of the problem26. A discussion restricted to any of these topics would
have been of considerably greater use to reformers.
Finally, Sentencing can be criticized for raising, but not adequately
addressing, the problem of government's role in sentencing. This involves
two issues, unreasonable standards and government enforcement 27.
Concerning unreasonable standards, for example, the federal Fisheries
Act 27a deems pollution to be any emission of toxic substances into water
"frequented" by fish. The impossibility of holding industry to such
series was funded to explore. Here, criminal law is meant in its non-technical sense. The present
Constitution Act, s. 91 gives jurisdiction to create criminal law exclusively to the federal
government Criminal law in its non-technical sense encompasses both federal and provincial
statutes that create offences enforced by fine or imprisonment.
21. Supra, note 5 at 45.
22. Id., at 69.
23. Instead of these aims, the report discussed protection of the public, retribution,
rehabilitation and reform, and deterrence.
24. Supra, note 5 at 68-9.
25. Id., at 68.
26. Id., at 38-40.
27. Id., at 36.
27a. R.S.C. 1970, c.F-14, s.33(2).
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standards leads government to loose enforcement. Indeed, government
agencies are forced to waive the standard every time they come to
agreement with any particular industry on licensing standards. In such
circumstances, enforcement then involves one government body
penalizing an industry for what another government body has
sanctioned8. Sentencing also acknowledges that even reasonable
standards have not been properly enforced 29. Government seems to judge
other interests more important than environmental enforcement.
The problems associated with government's different interests in the
environment are addressed more thoroughly in the third Law Reform
Commission report, Schrecker's The Political Economy of Environmental
Hazard. Schrecker's report moves away from emphasis on enforcement
and towards the establishment of government standards. The report raises
the problem of bias. There is bias at two important levels: in knowledge
and in politics.
In knowledge, there is bias with respect to uncertainty. One part of this
bias lies in cost-benefit analysis, the other part in the distinction between
false positives and false negatives.
The distinction between false positives and false negatives is a simple
point with far-reaching consequences 3°. The distinction is employed with
respect to toxic substances, especially with regard to carcinogenicity
(whether the substance is cancer causing). A false positive is a finding that
a substance is toxic when it really isn't; conversely, a false negative is a
finding that a substance isn't toxic when it really is. It is a question of
broad policy which concept is preferred when determining the
admissibility of new substances into the market for public use. Prudence
suggests a more restrictive test standard so that false negatives occur more
frequently than false positives, and public health wins out over quick
economic gain. However, the general political-economic pursuit of
growth has resulted in a Canadian regulatory system that favours risking
more false negatives 31.
28. Courts have been necessarily cautious in dealing with these situations. In R. v. United Keno
Hill Mines Ltd (1980), 10 C.E.L.R. 43 at 47, the court stated: "It is nevertheless relevant to
consider corporate evidence of the excessive nature of environmental regulations. In the
absence of evidence suggesting that reasonable environmental management is fostered by the
imposed standards, some mitigation in sentencing is appropriate where the company is striving
to meet the standards. In this case the evidence substantially favoured the corporation's view
that the standards were excessive and not designed to serve any articulated environmental
management scheme."
29. Supra, note 5 at 36.
30. Supra, note 6 at 26. Taken from Page, T., "A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and
Similar Risks" (1979), 7 Ecology Law Quarterly 207.
31. Supra, note 6 at 26.
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The second aspect of environmental uncertainty concerns the use of
cost-benefit analysis. Like the principle behind false negatives and false
positives, the basic principle of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is quite
simple: in making decisions about environmental impact one should
determine whether the total costs of a particular action outweigh the
benefits32. CBA also has widespread usage in both industry and
government33. In the environmental field in particular, CBA is one aspect
of the environmental impact assessments required by most governments
in deciding upon the feasibility of public (and private) projects34.
The principle of CBA would be practical were the world easily
quantifiable, but thus far it hasn't been. The problem is often expressed
as the "externalities" problem - the fact that the normal pricing
mechanisms of the market do not apply to certain public goods. But the
problem of pricing is more deep-seated than this. It is often forgotten how
much government policy - expressed through vehicles like regulation
- structures and affects market prices.
The fundamental problem is not the lack of markets, it is the lack of
any consistent or rational valuation technique. This failing has two direct
implications for cost-benefit tallies; first, they are at best confined to the
current day's concerns, and second, they are biased in favour of private
interests.
Both of these implications prejudice environmental concerns. The cost
side of CBA will be calculable since controls usually have a direct short-
term effect on particular private industries, and profit concerns give them
an obvious reason to calculate these effects. However, the benefits
accruing from pollution controls will usually be both long-term and
public, and thus extremely difficult to calculate. (For example, what is the
tally of Canadian public welfare from the reduction of water pollution?)35
These arguments make it clear that in two major issues involving
government regulation of uncertainty, industry is favoured. Both issues
undermine the idea that environmental reform depends simply on
tougher enforcement.
Political Economy has a second part to its story, however. The problem
of knowledge may be placed within a larger problem: politics. Concepts
32. Id., at 46.
33. Schrecker mentions its application to personal injury cases. Generally, a notorious
example of its use was the Ford Motor Company's CBA for the Pinto and its exploding gas
tank.
34. See Emond, P., Cotton, R. "Environmental Impact Assessment" in Swaigen J. (ed.)
Environmental Rights in Canada (Butterworths: Toronto, 1981)
35. See Ackerman, B.A. The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (Free Press: New
York, 1974) at 342. Interestingly, Ackerman considers this quantification process to have
overestimated certain benefits.
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and procedures may promote bias, but their bias is only important when
individuals make the decision to use them.
The real issue of Political Economy is the activity of government. It has
not acted neutrally to balance public interests:
Existing statutes and distributions of political resources provide powerful
advantages to one set of interested parties: the firms and industries which
generate such hazards, rather than the individuals who are the recipients of
them 36.
This bias has been particularly evident in the Canadian regulatory and
licensing processes. Both federally and provincially37, government makes
regulations and grants licenses on the basis of consultations with business
only. Business is judged the only major interest. Not simply is the public
not given information regarding such negotiations, government does its
best to keep the public out: the negotiations are usually conducted in
secret38.
Such bias has extended as far as the legislative process. For example,
the pre-legislative process of the federal government's Environmental
Contaminants Act39 involved the public only after industry negotiations
produced two drafts of the law4O. While the final draft was acceptable to
the chemical industry, it was, even at its proclamation, less restrictive
than comparable U.S. legislation. Moreover, the Act's regulatory
contribution has been minimal, listing only a half dozen substances as
toxic while the United States' list involves almost two hundred
substances. This fact still stands41. Clearly, the Canadian approach of
excluding the public leaves the public poorly represented.
Moreover, the negotiation model of regulation-making is problematic
for another reason: it allows delay. Objectives on pollution levels may be
agreed upon, but they are frequently subject to timetables for compliance.
Such timetables are "characterized by slippage as industry compliance is
repeatedly delayed and deadlines repeatedly extended."42
Even where negotiation results in substantial agreement, government
has enforced its position selectively. Schrecker cites some surprising
statistics: (1) between 1970 and 1977, 12 federal prosecutions of pulp
and paper companies resulted in only $18,500 in fines; (2) between 1968
36. Supra, note 6 at 4.
37. ld., at 8.
38. Id., at 7.
39. S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 72.
40. Supra, note 6 at 7.
41. Revisions to the Act have been proposed under Part II of Bill C-74, "The Canadian
Environmental Protection Act". But these revisions have only received First Reading.
42. Supra, note 6 at 9
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and 1976, 17 Ontario prosecutions resulted in only $18,600 in fines43.
Given such meagre penalties for pollution violations, it is not surprising
that Schrecker finds a "persistent and nationwide noncompliance with
the relevant government objectives." 44
Against any suspicion that this is not a fair report, merely some
ungrounded polemic, one should note the views expressed by the noted
environmental lawyer, David Estrin, in 1975:
The procedures for approval of new pollution sources ... are also the
subject of criticisms. Again the general rule is that such applications are
handled in a secret process between the applicant and the agency. No
notice of the application is given to other industries or residents in the area,
nor are they given, even if they are aware of it, any legal right to
meaningfully make their views known 45:
To conclude this part, the analysis of the two Law Reform
Commission reports dealing with enforcement measures imply a certain
view of government. Within the big picture, both reports advocate
stronger enforcement measures. Both imply that government's present
approach falls short because the government lacks sufficient measures to
properly enforce environmental harm. This applies just as clearly to the
federal government as it does to the ten provincial governments. Both the
new crime and new sentencing policy are therefore meant to aid
government in a serious crackdown on industry.
When one places these perceptions of government's role in
enforcement within Schrecker's perspective, a clear problem arises. If
government has not been tough in creating its initial legislation, if it has
not been tough in drawing up regulation standards, if it has -not been
tough in negotiating particular agreements, why is it to be expected that
tough penal measures are a suitable response? If government hasn't
towed a tough line all along, why are tough options at the level of
enforcement likely to be used? Surely the only use of such reforms would
be within a context where strict enforcement of present provisions was
proving inadequate to cope with violations. According to Schrecker,
nothing could be further from the truth.
Schrecker's position reveals government's commitment outside the
litigation sphere. When one acknowledges the disproportionality
between actions involving litigation and day-to-day governmental
actions, one realizes that Schrecker has raised the real problem. In its day-
to-day operations, government has committed itself to industry, not the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Estrin, D. "Annual Survey of Canadian Law Part 2: Environmental Law" (1975), 7
Ottawa Law Journal 385 at 408.
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environment. Within such a picture, enforcement reforms are only a
pittance. Environmentalists need reforms that overcome government's
present bias towards business interests.
III. Habermas and the Critique of Instrumentalism
Schrecker suggests that government bias is not so much an environmental
issue as a political issue, beginning his report with Schattschneider's
comment that:
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation
of certain kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because
organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into
politics while others are organized out46.
The German theorist, Jurgen Habermas, provides a sophisticated
analysis of this politicization. He concentrates on the distinction between
public and private interests, arguing that government has reduced the
public sphere to private interests. Habermas grounds this criticism
historically in the origin of modernity. Modernity's origin, is the 18th
century alliance between capitalism and democracy47.
Capitalism was essentially private. It demanded self-interest in the
individual and encouraged such self-interest in the goal of efficient
production. Efficient production was expected to come from the
increasing perfection of humanity's domination of nature. As our control
improved, so would efficiency.
Democracy, on the other hand, was essentially public. Here, the
individual was encouraged to be a citizen. Citizenship was modelled on
the ancient Athenian model of public discussion 48. Each .citizen'had an
equal say in public decision-making. The democratic ideal involved every
citizen of the modern state having one vote so that public discussion
tended towards accommodation and recognition. Every person was
important.
The success of each sphere depended on the success of the other.
Capitalist interests would succeed in controlling nature efficiently only by
democratically promoting both an equal access to markets and the free
flow of information. Democratic interests would succeed in instilling
citizenship when they encouraged capitalist interests to increase the
available supply of basic material needs.
46. Schrecker, supra, note 6 at 1.
47. Habermas, J. "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article" (1974), New German
Critique at 52-3.
48. Habermas, J. Theory and Practice (Beacon Press: Boston, 1974) at 48: "The order of the
polis was actualized in the participation of the citizens in administration, legislation, justice and
consultation."
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At first glance, this understanding seems anything but environmental-
ist. Indeed, Habermas' perspective on modemity's origin seems anti-
environmentalist for its support of human domination of nature. The
appreciation of this perspective's relevance for environmental reform
depends on two steps.
The first step is the acknowledgement that any concern expressed
about nature is a human concern, not a concern for nature itself. This
acknowledgement in no way reduces the number of perspectives that
may be held with respect to nature. It merely reminds us of their human
origin. The claim that nature has rights - for example, Stone's question,
"Should trees have standing?"49 - itself depends on human appreciation
of natural values. Such values hardly seem intuitive. The Banff-Jasper
national parks region, for example, has regulated its forests to such an
extent that the ecosystem is imbalanced: there has been insufficient
natural regeneration. Our lack of perfect information 0 about the
environment means that "environmental values" are only human
hypotheses on such values.
The second step is the acknowledgement that the concern to protect
the environment is reducible to the concern to give interested parties a
chance to control their environment. The Banff-Jasper example shows
that protection per se is not necessarily good for the environment.
Movements like the conservation movement are therefore not valuable
for what they claim about nature - conservation does not have universal
validity - they are valuable for what they claim about ourselves.
Once these moves are appreciated, environmental concerns show
themselves to be directly and inextricably tied to political concerns.
In historical terms, environmental concerns may be expressed as
valuing public over private interests and democratic over capitalist
interests. Today, however, it is difficult to rely on these distinctions.
Democratic values have been overshadowed: the government is now in
the marketplace, not just regulating it.
Using familiar legal terms, Habermas emphasizes that the modem
political system has moved government into the private sphere and
brought capitalism into the public sphere. Yet this "New Deal" economic
involvement in the economy has not resulted in democracy controlling
49. (1972), 45 S. Cal. L.R. 450. There is thus considerable irony in environmental law's
relation to other law. Most law is centered in the human realm, but is instrumental.
Environmental law reaches out into nature and thus involves instrumental interests, yet argues
against instrumentalism.
50. This shortcoming is not to suggest that information is irrelevant to environmental disputes
- facts do decide the reasonableness of values. See Lemons, J. "Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide:
Environmental Ethics and Environmental Facts" (1983), 5 Environmental Ethics at 21.
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capitalism; rather, government involvement has only extended
capitalism. The capitalist criteria for efficiency in the technological
control of nature have become government criteria in the technological
control of society. Today, efficiency is entrenched in both our relation to
nature and our relation to each other.
This perception of contemporary society may be supported by current
interest in Law and Economics theory. Law and Economics has received
increased political force in the last 20 years. It is primarily an American
movement, but it has spilled over into the Canadian legal scene51.
For two reasons, Law and Economics might appear compatible with
Habermas' perspective. First, Law and Economics clearly distinguishes
between private and public law. This appears to accord with Habermas'
distinction between public and private realms. Second, Law and
Economics may remind us of capitalism's traditional relationship to
democracy: it was bourgeois interests that grounded the public sphere in
the first place, even on Habermas' account.
Economists can argue that while their goal is efficiency, they assume
democracy. They may say that economic efficiency depends on both
unrestricted access to a market and inability of particular firms to alter
the efficient outcome 2. Both of these assumptions apply democratic
criteria to the market model.
Those concerned with Law and Economics may make a similar claim
in favour of democracy. This claim may be made even though the Law
and Economics perspective moves from strict market concerns to focus
on efficient dispute resolution.
The shift involves some intricate footwork. While economics talks
about equal status between members of a market in its generation of
efficiency, Law and Economics ignores status in dispute resolution. This
alteration of a traditional assumption of microeconomic theory is given a
just defence by Law and Economics theorists. They point out that for
them to posit equality, they would have to ignore the inequality involved
in various legal disputes.
Unfortunately, this response only provides a partial answer to the
problem facing Law and Economics theory. If legal disputes necessarily
involve unequal parties, how does a democratic outcome arise out of
efficient law-making? For its answer, Law and Economics goes back to
the foundation of the democratic-capitalist alliance: the exchange of
information. Parties need not have equal power for disputes to be
51. Trebilcock, M.J., "The Prospects of 'Law and Economics': A Canadian Perspective",
(1983), Journal of Legal Education at 288.
52. These are axioms of general microeconomic theory.
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resolved democratically; instead, they need perfect information 3. With
perfect information, the judge is able to appreciate the full consequences
of his decision on each party and is capable of providing a settlement,
effectively balancing each interest.
But is this rationalization of law-making democratic? First, it makes
democratic law-making one that preserves the inequality of parties, not
law-making that reduces inequality. Second, it depends on perfect
information. In environmental disputes, perfect information simply
doesn't exist.
Law and Economics does not ever come to grips with the first
problem. But their energies have been devoted to the second problem.
They frequently use environmental disputes, such as common law
nuisance, as a model application of their analysis. Different remedies are
proposed for a nuisance dispute depending on the status of the available
information. Thus, the problem of information is overcome by making
information itself subject to efficiency rules: information has its price.
People will pay for what they need as information, and only what they
need 54.
This answer completes a most unsatisfactory circle. Perfect
information was supposed to be an assumption of the market in arriving
at efficiency, not subject to it. While the former point of view may be
consistent with Habermas' perspective, since it gives priority to
democratic interests in demanding perfect information as a requirement
of instrumental efficiency, the latter is precisely the perspective that
Habermas opposes. Efficiency should not determine democratic interests;
instrumentalism applies to nature, not society.
The American legal scholar, Horwitz, questioned whether Law and
Economics was science or ideology. It would now be clear why he
answered that it was ideology55.
In contrast to Law and Economics' weak view of social values,
Habermas' proposals emphasize them. The earlier discussion of the
efficiency orientation of government may now be developed.
Government in the economy signals the confusion of public and private
spheres and the suppression of democratic values by capitalist values.
Everything is geared towards results, with short-term results taking
priority over long-term goals.
53. Coase's theorem states: "In a competitive economy with zero transaction costs and perfect
information, the allocation of resources will be efficient however the law distributes initial
entitlements." From Kupersburg, Mark; Beitz, C. (ed.) Law, Economics, and Philosophy: A
CriticalIntroduction to the Law of Torts (Rowman and Allanheld: New Jersey, 1983) at 5.
54. Rhoads, S.C., The Economist's View of the World (Cambridge: New York, 1985) at 143.
55. Horwitz, M. "Law and Economics: Science or Politics?" (1981), 8 Hofstra Law Review
905 at 912.
Conflicting Principles of Canadian Environmental Law Reform
The result of efficiency applied to political control is the destruction of
meaningful communication. Both government and industry may be
criticized as instrumentalist. Both promote a view that people are better
ordered than heard: individuals may be fully satisfied by material gain;
society may be fully realized by efficient structuring. There is little need
for real participation.
Habermas hopes to show a way beyond this ever-tightening circle by
re-emphasizing the role of communication in modernity's origin.
Communication has a clear relation to both public interests and
democratic interests: language is both public and democratic. It is public
because it exists apart from any particular individual's interests; it is
democratic because its development is a product of all of society's
interests. A flourishing language demands a flourishing, public
democracy.
Instrumentalism does have its place for Habermas. But it is a restricted
instrumentalism. Habermas resolves the current conflict between
communicative and instrumental values by giving each value a distinct
application: instrumentalism guides technological efficiency; communica-
tion guides social democracy.
Environmental reform therefore depends on communicative interests
effectively balancing instrumentalist interests.
Clearly such a policy of reform has widespread application in
Canadian environmental law. One application is the reform of the law's
present bias with respect to collective interests. Both interest groups and
corporations may involve large numbers of individuals. Yet the law has
favoured corporate groups over general interest groups. It has favoured
private instrumentalism over public discussion and citizenship. The fact
that corporations represent the interests of particular citizens or groups of
citizens is hidden behind the corporate veil56.
There are three specific examples of this favourtism towards
corporations: standing, unity of interest, and tax deduction of fees.
The privilege accorded corporations with respect to standing derives
from their status as legal individuals57. From this status, the pursuit of
56. Andrew Fraser provides a useful exposition of this transition within American society
(Fraser, A. "The Corporation as a Body Politic" (1983), 57 Telos 5). Fraser traces the
evolution of the corporation in American society from an origin requiring service of the public
good, to one assuming private ecotnomie purpose has an implicit public good. Fraser argues
that the movement of corporations away from public service status was not, however, anti-
democratic. The liberalization went hand-in-hand with democracy. In Fraser's reasoning, the
corporation as a public institution depended on an aristocratic vision of American society.
Restrictions on corporate charters served to protect those who had status. Corporate-
democracy required an opening up of legislative practice.
57. Eg., Companies Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 42, s. 24(5)(c) as am. by S.N.S. 1982, c.17, s.7.
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profit then allows corporations to distinguish their interest from that of
the general public. Lost profit is always a legitimate interest in a dispute.
These two privileges become a real issue when corporations are
involved in environmental disputes. While corporations have such
privileges, public interest groups do not. Such groups bear the onus of
establishing their legitimacy. Traditionally, private property interests have
received standing, but clear public interests have not received the same
sympathy. Even with the recent trend towards liberalizing standing
rules58, public interests still have restricted access to the courts. The
common law offence of nuisance, for example, has traditionally restricted
public interests from raising a dispute in court without the consent of the
Attorney-General. Individuals and groups have also been caught where
the defendant is government. Canadian courts have used their discretion
on standing to disallow actions demanding government enforcement of
its regulations as well as actions demanding government to act intra
vires59.
Corporations are also privileged over public interest groups because of
their unity of interest. This unity of interest has two aspects. First, no
matter how big the corporation, it is taken for granted that it represents
one unified interest. The court will not inquire behind its corporate veil.
A policy may have been hotly debated. It may be opposed by
shareholders or unions within the corporation. Nevertheless, these
differences will not appear before courts of law. The hidden assumption
is that profit motivates all groups so that they form one interest. Courts
don't examine whether the corporation has pursued different strategies -
i.e. growth versus profit - benefitting some of its members but not
others60. Second, once corporations are before the courts as one interest,
the courts have accorded corporations special status: Xerox corporation
does not count merely as one individual when the court considers
remedies like injunctions. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement61, for example,
the court looked behind the parties to judge that many persons not before
the court would be negatively affected by an injunction - parties like
unions, etc. The court failed to consider, however, the parties not before
the court that would benefit from the injunction.
58. See the public interest cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada: Thorson v. A.G.
Can. (1974), 43 D.L.R.(3d) 1; McNeil v. N.S. Board of Censors (1975), 55 D.L.R.(3d) 632;
Borowski v. A.G. Can. and Minister of Finance, Can. (1981), 130 D.L.R.(3d) 538.
59. See Pim v. Ministry of Environment (1978), 23 O.R.(2d)45; Rosenberg v. Grand River
ConservationAuthority (1976), 96 D.L.R.(3d) 384 (Ont. C.A.).
60. Gower, L.C.B. Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed. (Stevens and Sons:
London, 1979)
61. (1970) 26 N.Y 2d 219; cited from Stewart, K.B., Krier, J.E. Environmental Law and
Policy (Bobbs-Merill: New York, 1978) at 238.
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By contrast, public interest groups must prove unity of interest. This
unity is established under class action rules. These rules require groups to
satisfy a number of tests62. Apart from these tests, class actions still face
a number of category problems. They cannot involve contract disputes63,
and they cannot seek anything except group damages64. Moreover, once
such unity is established, special rules on costs through class actions
restrict the likelihood of bringing such actions. The liability rules for costs
make it necessary to make one party the representative party and to tag
that one party with the brunt of the costs should the action fail65. Who
is tagged with costs when corporations go bankrupt?
The net effect of these restrictions is that it is hard for environmental
interests to get before the court in large numbers. This has two effects: it
makes it difficult for such interests to satisfy the courts that their interests
are equal to that of corporations on a balance of convenience, and it
means that the costs of lawsuits are borne by fewer parties.
A final bias accorded corporations in their ability to deduct their
litigation cost from their taxes since they are spent in pursuit of profit.
Public interest groups may not do this66. Nor is there any strong trend
towards contingency fees that might allow this tax difference to be of
reduced effect 67.
This favouritism transcends the public-private distinction. Corpora-
tions are created by statute and yet count as private interests, while
interest groups without any statutory recognition are required to meet the
standard of representing a public interest.
Three reforms would remedy a large part of the differences existing
between corporations and interest groups. First, the courts could further
reduce standing requirements; second, the courts could presume unity of
interest for interest groups, requiring the defendant to disprove unity68;
third, government could level tax breaks consistently by either subsidizing
both sides or by eliminating the deduction from the corporate side.
Yet these reforms are only a one-sided response to the bias against
communicative interests currently exhibited by Canadian legal
62. See: Chester, S. "Class Actions to Protect the Environment: A Real Weapon or Just
Another Lawyer's Word Game?" from Swaigen, J., Environmental Rights in Canada
(Butterworths: Toronto, 1981).
63. Id., at 93.
64. Id., at 71 citing Shaw v. Real Estate Bd. of Greater Vancouver (1972), 29 D.L.R. (3d)
774 (B.C.S.C.)
65. Id., at 72.
66. See'Income TaxAct, ss. 9, 18(1)(a).
67. While Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules permit contingency fees, other Canadian
jurisdictions like Ontario do not.
68. See" Chester, supra, note 61.
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institutions. Certainly, the advantage of organizing collective interests is
that such interests may create a voice that compares with industry's voice,
a voice that government may hear. Such reform fails to recognize,
however, that the type of interest is not the only problem plaguing
environmental concerns. The suggestion that law reform is aided by
increasing the numbers of collective interests going before the courts
ignores the threat that size itself poses.
Mark Sagoff provides an effective criticism of such reform in arguing
that corporations are "ugly because they are anti-democratic ' 69.
Competition is not in itself anti-democratic; indeed competition ideally
fosters democracy since there are no entrenched positions. However, the
corporate model of competition skews this basic model by entrenching
performance through corporate status. The corporate model is not like
the Indian chief growing older and needing a successor, a model where
life is the factor restricting entrenchment. It is a model where there is no
re-commencement: Xerox does not go back to nothing after its executive
officer steps down. Corporate status has no natural finitude. Corporate
size may grow infinitely.
The prejudice of size to democratic interests is not simply a corporate
feature: it is also a part of government bureaucracies. Big government is
just as anti-democratic as big business. It is anti-democratic at two levels.
At a first level, it is anti-democratic because elected officials may no
longer fully monitor the behaviour of public officials. The last 20 years
have seen criticism upon criticism of the failure of responsible
government. Government anti-democratic behaviour at a second level is
demonstrated in a recent Globe and Mail article, 70 which describes efforts
by the. federal environment minister to control public discussion
generated by members of his department. Present policy now allows only
a few specified individuals to speak directly to the media. Thus, not only
is government not responsible to Parliament, it is not accessible to public
media.
Such extensive information control contrasts sharply with an essential
part of the democratic-capitalist alliance. The public sphere is specifically
centered on the free flow of information.
Habermas' communicative reforms demand not only public
discussion, but public information. While the present day considers
information presumptively instrumentalist, forgetting its public value in
the midst of private competition, reform would recognize confidential
69. Sagoff, M. "Is Big Beautiful?" (1984), Journal of Applied Philosophy, no.2, October, 269
at 270.
70. Globe and Mail, Feb. 22, 1986, at A-4: "Freeze on information muzzles top environmental
advocates".
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information as a limiting case, not the general rule. Information would be
presumptively public, not private. Since all that is legitimately valued in
private information is lost profit, information control should not be a
prior restraint. Lost profit is always calculable.
In the United States, major freedom of information reform has been
attempted. What would succeed in Canada?
IV. Canadian Environmental Reform and the Manitoba Experiment
Sagoff again provides a useful starting point to discussion of Canadian
efforts to open up the information needed in environmental reform.
Sagoff focusses on the question of political legitimacy. Legitimacy is
judged the crucial factor in appreciating a respective society's need for
public information. Sagoff contrasts the American and British legal
traditions71.
In Sagoffs analysis, British legitimacy arises from a constellation of
interests that resemble those criticized by Schrecker. In Britain, the
system works through the alliance of business and government 72.Such an
alliance is not regarded as illegitimate. Support for Sagoff's perspective
comes from the tradition of parliamentary supremacy. Britain is a unitary
state. It is hierarchically focussed. By contrast, the United States is neither
unitary nor grounded in parliamentary supremacy. It is federalist and
governed by a balance of powers among the executive, Congress and the
Supreme Court.
Political decisions made in Britain, have received legitimacy from
models of cost-benefit analysis73. The attempt to be objective is deemed
legitimate in Britain. By contrast, cost-benefit analysis has been
discredited in the United States74, where the institutional framework of
balance of powers has affected the citizens' view of legitimacy. According
to Sagoff, the tradition does not grant legitimacy on the basis of
objectivity, it grants it on the basis of interest. Different issues involve
different interest groups. Moreover, within the balance of powers
structure, the courts are on equal footing with Congress. Both are equal
grantors of legitimacy to particular interests. By contrast, British courts
remain deferential to parliament. Their legal tradition has remained
formal. Legitimacy is thus more broadly based in the United States.
Sagoff's analysis highlights the particular -context within which Canada
finds itself. Certainly, the United States exerts a wide influence, but our
71. Supra, note 67 at 277.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id., at 278.
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legal tradition also has strong ties to Britain75. We should not regard our
difference from the U.S. as a sign of failure. Our traditions are different.
Such differences should suggest the need for different reforms. Yet
Canadian reforms frequently fail to consider these differences. For
example, Canadian reform creating environmental impact assessment
failed to appreciate the role of government. When the U.S. government
first legislated for environmental impact assessment, it was thought to be
a progressive step, subjecting all large scale public projects to
examination by government. Government was to play the role of
enforcer or judge. But on the American adjudicative model, government
is not simply an enforcer or judge, but serves three roles: it may judge and
it may prosecute; equally importantly, however, government defends.
The success of environmental impact assessment was ensured only
because it was part of both a public willingness to sue the government
when standards weren't adhered to, and a judicial willingness to support
these enforcement proceedings76.
Contrast this collusion with the Canadian scene in cases like R. v.
Stein77. In Stein, the plaintiff sought enforcement of a city by-law
requiring an environmental impact assessment be taken before city
spraying could begin. The court rejected her application even though it
admitted the city's failure to observe the statute. The court found its way
beyond this violation by conducting its own version of an environmental
impact assessment and concluding that, on a balance of convenience, the
city should not be held to the requirement.
Cases like Stein suggest that though the American approach should not
be entirely dismissed, successful reform in the United States
environmental law field may not result in successful reform here.
Trubeck reminds us that the differences are not simply legal. While
Stein reminds us that our tradition lacks judicial activism, Trubeck forces
reformers to consider economic, cultural and political factors. Such
considerations could have influenced Quebec's reform of class actions,
for example. One goal of this reform was the creation of a public fund to
ease the financial burden on particular claimants. When this reform was
considered, the Quebec Ministry of Justice extrapolated figures from
California78. An appreciation of Trubeck's picture would reveal that
Quebec had extensive non-legal differences with California, differences
75. It is one shortcoming of this article that it does not explore the influence of the French
Civil law tradition on environmental matters.
76. Sax, J.L. "Environmental Law - The U.S. Experience" from Morley, L., Canada's
Environment" The Law on Trial (University of Manitoba, 1973) at 164.
77. (1974), 5 W.W.R. 484 (Man. C.A.)
78. See Chester, supra, note 61.
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that would make it extremely unlikely for their figures to match on a
person-by-person basis. Quebec has only recently conquered an
extremely traditional hierarchical structure. By contrast, California has a
tradition of progressive political movements to support progressive legal
reforms.
Another application of Trubeck's model of legal thought may be found
in Trebilcock's observation that Law and Economics is less likely to
influence Canadian society than it has American society because major
Canadian development involves closer ties to government than does
corresponding American development 79. Collective intervention in the
economy is more of a fact of life here.
On the one hand, we are not a unitary system, but one with checks and
balances; on the other hand, we are not adjudicative, but compromising.
The British nation state ideal is ineffective in dealing with a conflicting
public interest, while the American adjudicative model is ineffective in
dealing with a tradition of deference.
In contrast to the American position that political legitimacy comes
from tension and resolution - a position that differentiates concerns to
encourage conflict - the Manitoba experiment provided results using a
cooperative strategy 0 . Unlike the British tradition, the Manitoba results
were not objective, nor even imposed. The experiment provides a model
integration of citizen and government action.
To return to Habermas, the Manitoba experiment is an example of
communicative interests structuring reform. The Manitoba experiment
promoted public dialogue in two ways. First, it set a priority of contacting
people to establish a community's interest; it did not make assumptions
based on economic rationality. Second, it contacted individuals on the
basis of residency in the area, not on the basis of commercial interests.
People gave views as citizens, not as employers or employees.
An article by J.E. Page and M.E. Carvallo outlines the Manitoba
process81. The first phase was governmental. A series of studies done in
the 1960s provided a groundwork for the project done in the early
1970s02. The second part saw government test its participatory model of
development strategy on a smaller scale.
79. Trebilock, supra, note 50 at 289. Also, returning to Schrecker's emphasis on the Canadian
regulatory process, it is worth emphasizing its contrast with the American practice. In the area
of regulation, the consultations are beyond the hands of government and business interests.
Through the innovation of "notice and comment" procedures, government bodies are legally
required to give reasonable public notice of regulation hearing for all regulatory reform.
80. Page, J.E., Carvalho, M.E., "Southern Manitoba: An Experiment in Regional Action",
from Leiss, W. Ecology Versus Politics in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1979) at 209-
32.
81. Id., at 209.
82. Id., at 220.
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From these preliminary steps, the Manitoba government initiated a
process that integrated 75,000 square miles of the province into one
development strategy under the name of the regional access program 83.
At the outset, government was concerned with more than economic
factors: of equal value were environmental and social values.
The basic issue was the need to balance regional development
rationally. Winnipeg was getting much larger; rural communities were
getting smaller 84. The Manitoba government wanted to know which
communities it should encourage to grow and which communities it
should leave to die.
Social values were in issue because the government knew that
community values would determine a particular community's future.
Effective use of government resources depended on government
appreciating the individuals forming such communities. Did they want to
stay or did they prefer to go? What factors determined their decision?85
Environmental values were in issue because certain communities were
situated in more arable land than others. Government needed to know
the particular constitution of each region's ecosystem and its potential for
agricultural growth86.
The project had several phases87. It began with a questionnaire
circulated to five per cent of the population. Phase two involved putting
this information together without drawing conclusions. Phase three was
the most important: it involved the exchange of information between the
government and the particular communities. The government's premise
was that community evaluations deserved as equal a weight as their own.
The process of integration involved two caravans going out to the
communities, sharing and gathering reactions to the database formed in
phase two. It is worth noting that the government's particular concern lay
in appreciating the attitude of the "under 30" crowd8 8, since they would
constitute the future of the communities. The fourth phase involved
particular responses to the integration of community and government
interests. This involved "clustering"89 concerns and establishing lead
agencies for the implementation of development strategies 0.
83. Id., at 209,210.
84. Id., at 210, 223.
85. Id., at 212.
86. Id., at 215.
87. Id., at 220-221.
88. Id., at 222.
89. Id., at 223.
90. Id.
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Thus, the Manitoba experiment provides an example of large-scale,
polycentric9l environmental reform. It may be favourably contrasted
with the American attempt at governmental cooperation in the example
of the Delaware River clean-up, for example92. The Manitoba example
shows a provincial government providing an initial database and then
going out to other levels of government, both federal93 and local, to
gather further information. Moreover, the Manitoba experiment departs
from the technocratic model by not presuming a rational outcome, but
rather going out and gathering its consensus.
By contrast, the American experience in the Delaware River clean-up
began with a division of expertise along its familiar policy of balancing
powers. Ackerman 94 shows the limitations of this approach. Certainly
one of its drawbacks was its technocratic emphasis95. The basis of the
study was cost-benefit analysis, not citizen opinion. Ackerman reinforces
the conclusions drawn above concerning the consequence of this
approach within American decision-making. There was
a fundamental tension between the demands of sound technocratic
decision-making and the nature of American federalism. The technocratic
political decision, whatever its ultimate value, requires tight integration
among fact-finders, analysts and politicians. In contrast, federalism is
instinct with the demand that power be fractionalized among competing
groups and levels of government, and the suspicion that a coherent, tightly
organized governing structure will, by virtue of that fact, possess too much
power and so act irresponsibly. Unfortunately, the federalist attempt to
eliminate the possibility of the abuse of power can often make it
impossible to use the power intelligently as well96.
It is not suggested that what happened in Manitoba may happen
everywhere; nor is it suggested that the balance of powers approach taken
in the United States with respect to the clean-up of the Delaware Basin
is always so ineffective. What is suggested is that the Manitoba example
provides a definitive Canadian example of environmental reform, for it
takes into account factors in our tradition that distinguish us from both
the American and British legal traditions.
91. The term "polycentric" contrasts with the normal adjudicative structure. While
adjudicative proceedings involve two conflicting interests settled by one intermediary,
polycentric reform has many interests without defined opposition. The Manitoba experiment
is polycentric since it gathered results from many groups, representing many interests.
92. See: Ackerman, supra, note 35 at 189.
93. Federal government involvement came out at the level of organizing environmental data
using the Federal Canada Land Inventory.
94. Supra, note 35.
95. Id., at 73-8. See also at 28 for an example of the "technocratic numbers game" with
respect to environmental harm.
96. Id., at 189.
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The Manitoba reform emphasis on community standards is not meant
to restrict the involvement of the federal government in environmental
reform. Community standards merely reflect the involvement of the
public. A national community seems no less possible than a local
community. Manitoba is distinct not for its local emphasis, but for its
example of a government determined to involve the public.
The fact that such determination arose out of prior legislative failures
is of little consequence. It is of consequence that government realized that
reform is most effectively implemented when the public has had a say in
establishing it.
V. Conclusion
This paper has examined environmental law in an uncharacteristic way.
While most approaches involving the integration of law with other fields
of interest or inquiry tend to assimilate such approaches into a legal
framework97, this paper began from the strictest legal framework and
gradually worked outwards, away from law towards other reformist
disciplines.
Throughout, the paper has relied on Trubeck's emphasis on the extra-
legal influences on law. Schrecker's work questions the effectiveness of
the law's adjudicative-enforcement picture by revealing structural
problems in the very formulation of government standards. He moves
law into policy science. Sagoff disengages legal thinking from merely
institutional concerns to show the value of history and tradition in
understanding present institutional biases. Habermas raises questions
about the instrumentalist notion of law - particularly, the integration of
law and economics - by revealing basic ethical values that precede
instrumental concerns. Finally, Page and Carvallo have shown how even
something as close to home in law as the notion of reform may
nevertheless be wrenched from the grasp of lawyers. By placing reform in
the hands of planners, the Manitoba experiment provided a comprehen-
sive development strategy that matched its context as much as any reform
could.
97. For example, in the early 70s, Sweden encouraged the formation of community discussion
groups nation-wide to discuss the future of nuclear power in the country.
